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Abstract
Information System (IS) research can be seen as a rich tapestry of paradigms, methods, and 
research approaches. Amongst others, design science is an established approach in IS research 
and the literature provides us with a comprehensive and useful debate on the basic concepts. 
However, many researchers advocating the stance of design science, neglect the influence of basic 
philosophical and epistemological issues on design science. Here, design science is often 
advocated as a third paradigm that adds up to positivism and interpretivism. Instead, we argue 
that the understanding of such concepts as ‘research rigor’, ‘research validity’ and ‘research 
quality’ depends heavily on the underlying epistemological understanding, and this certainly 
applies to design science! In order to demonstrate and operationalize our argument, we  analyze 
Hevner et al.’s guidelines for design science in IS research (2004), taking an interpretivist 
perspective influenced by Klein & Myers’s set of principles for conducting and evaluating 
interpretive field studies (1999). Instead of arguing in favor of a specific epistemology, we seek to 
develop opportunities for epistemological diversity in design-oriented IS research and wish to 
contribute to establishing a constructive pluralism of research perspectives. 
Keywords:  Diversity, epistemology, design science research, research methods, research evaluation
Introduction: The Challenge of Diversity
Information systems (IS) research is conducted in a multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural context. Many other 
disciplines in addition to information systems – business administration, information science, sociology, psychology 
etc. – contribute to studying the development, implementation, and usage of information systems and information 
technology within organizations (Fitzgerald & Howcroft 1998; Wade & Hulland 2004). In addition, the contribution 
of many different (national) research communities to the ‘international’ discussion in IS research is substantial. 
Consequently, the internationalization of IS research is conspicuous. For example, within the European Union, the 
increasing shift of research emphasis from national to international institutions and organizations is quite evident, 
for instance, with respect to the EU framework research programs. International research projects are becoming 
more and more important and will become standard in the future. The question arises as to how we can benefit from 
the plurality of perspectives and as to the nature of the challenges that result from such diversity.1
1 As empirical research showed, different academic disciplines and research communities tend to adopt distinct 
research methodologies and approaches. Chen & Hirschheim (2004) conducted an empirical study analyzing eight 
major IS publication outlets between 1991 and 2001. The examination of 1893 articles published in American and 
European journals shows that, on a methodological level, quantitative methods dominate the USA research culture 
(71%), while 49% of the articles published in European journals apply qualitative methods. On the paradigmatic 
level, the vast majority (89%) of US publications are characterized by a positivist paradigm. Although European 
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A major problem of diversity is that working on the same subject does not necessarily mean that mutual 
understanding prevails. Especially against the background of often implicit assumptions, for instance, regarding 
philosophy of science, perspectives on ‘research rigor’, ‘research validity’ and also ‘research quality’ may vary 
considerably. In this respect, the discussion of research paradigms has influenced discourse in the IS discipline 
(Burrell & Morgan 1979; Chen & Hirschheim 2004; Hirschheim & Klein 1989; Iivari 1991). Paradigms are, in 
many cases, subconscious and not explicated by the individual conducting research. Paradigms are questioned 
mainly in those situations where research approaches based on distinct paradigms are confronted, that is, when they 
stem from different academic disciplines or research communities. At this point, differences in the implicit 
paradigmatic assumptions become evident and paradigmatic assumptions are analyzed. Furthermore, paradigms are 
often questioned when they fail to provide sufficient explanatory power with respect to new phenomena of interest 
(Kuhn 1962). What then does the discussion on research paradigms imply for IS research diversity?
In the IS discipline, we can observe a wide-ranging discussion of research paradigms (Weber 1987). Emphasis has 
been placed on the discussion of epistemological paradigms, especially positivism and interpretivism (Becker & 
Niehaves 2007; Fitzgerald & Howcroft 1998; Jones 2004; Lee 1991; Mingers 2001; Probert 2001; Russo & 
Stoltermann 2000; Walsham 1995; Weber 2004). Here, a paradigm is understood as a distinct worldview based on 
certain epistemological and ontological assumptions. However, the term paradigm is not only used to distinguish 
between particular epistemological positions. Hevner et al. (2004) and March and Smith (1995) introduce two 
distinct paradigms: behavioral science research and design science research. The former is understood as a “problem 
understanding paradigm”, the latter as a “problem solving paradigm” (Hevner et al. 2004; March & Smith 1995). 
Here, the term paradigm addresses two distinct phases of a problem-oriented process, understanding and solving it. 
Hence, the discussion of IS research paradigms is multi-facetted, for instance, epistemology on the one hand and 
behavioral vs. design science research on the other hand. Consequently, the discussion of IS research diversity 
should incorporate such “multi-facettedness”. The issue arises as to what could constitute a starting point for such an 
integrated discussion of IS diversity.
Both epistemology and behavioral & design science research have been heavily discussed in the IS literature and are 
vital to the discipline. While epistemology in behavioral science research has been discussed comprehensively, an 
integrated view on epistemology and design science research remains inadequate (Iivari 2007; McKay & Marshall 
2005; Schön 1983). Although several efforts have been made to theorize design science (cf. Hevner et al. 2004; Lee 
2000; March & Smith 1995; Nunamaker et al. 1991; Walls et al. 1992) an explicit epistemological stance has not yet 
been taken (for related approaches see Gregg et al. 2001; Schön 1983). At this point, there are multiple ways of 
approaching the epistemological discussion of design science. One option would be to ground the argumentation 
fully within a particular philosophy of design (science), such as Churchman’s (1971) inquiring systems. Another 
option would be to analyze the philosophical debate, on the one hand, and the design science debate, on the other 
hand, with respect to the current state of the IS literature/discipline. Here, we will opt for the second possibility for 
two reasons. Firstly, we do so in order to make one potential step of tying together some loose strings in the current 
IS debate – epistemology and design science, and secondly, in order to elaborate on how an integrated view of these 
two concepts can contribute to solving one of crucial issues that the IS discipline faces: how to benefit from a 
diversity of perspectives in IS research. For this reason, we address the following research question in this paper: 
How does epistemological diversity, in terms of positivism and interpretivism, influence the understanding of 
design science research?
With the aid of Klein and Myer’s (1999) set of principles for interpretive field studies, we integrate two IS research 
perspectives, interpretivism and design science research, by reflecting on Hevner et al.’s (2004) guidelines for 
design science research. Both sets of guidelines/principles seek to give practical advice to IS researchers. 
Consequently, we aim to elaborate on what epistemological diversity in design science research implies (in practice) 
for IS researchers. Thus, we seek to answer the following sub-questions in the course of the paper: 
• What are the basic features of the major epistemologies in IS research, specifically, positivism and 
interpretivism? 
• What are the basic characteristics of design science research and how can it be evaluated? 
journals also published mainly research based on positivist principles (66%), they tend to be much more receptive to 
interpretivist research (34%) than American journals.
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• Why is the discussion of epistemology relevant to design science research and how do these two concepts relate 
to each other? 
• What are the consequences of alternative epistemologies, specifically interpretivism, for understanding and 
evaluating design science research? 
In addressing our research objective, the research method chosen is that of conceptual philosophical research. We 
therefore provide philosophical-logical arguments rather than empirical ones. However, where applicable, our 
arguments also refer to empirical research results, in this case, a focused literature review.
Interpretivism and Interpretivist Research Evaluation 
The IS literature provides us with an extensive discussion on positivism and interpretivism (cf., for instance, Burrell 
& Morgan 1979; Chen & Hirschheim 2004; Fitzgerald & Howcroft 1998; Hirschheim & Klein 1989; Iivari et al. 
1998; Lee 1991; Monod 2003; Weber 2004). Epistemological assumptions are – alongside ontological and 
methodological ones – those mainly taken into account in order to identify and describe distinct (IS) research 
paradigms, most often positivism and interpretivism, as well as to differentiate them from each other (see Table 1).
Table 1: Analyzing Epistemological Assumptions of IS Research Paradigms (Becker & Niehaves 2007)






Functionalism, interpretivism, radical humanism, and 
structuralism
Iivari (1991) a. Ontology,
b. Epistemology, and
c. Methodology








Monod (2003) a. Epistemology I: Object of knowledge
b. Epistemology II: Origin of knowledge
Multiple IS research paradigms and philosophical 
trends, e.g. functionalism, constructivism, critical realism
Weber (2004) Multiple criteria; amongst others, ontology, 
epistemology, research object, method, 
theory of truth etc.
Positivism, interpretivism
However, even when discussing a seemingly established term, in this case, interpretivism, the meaning of the 
concept may vary considerably. In the IS research literature, two basic divergent streams of thought can be found 
with respect to the definition of positivism and interpretivism (for details see Niehaves & Stahl 2006). 
• Standpoint I: positivism and interpretivism feature distinct epistemological2 assumptions, but share the same 
ontological3 assumption: for instance, Weber (2004) argues that both positivism and interpretivism share the 
assumption that a ‘real world’ exists beyond the realms of human cognition. However, epistemologically 
speaking, positivism on the one hand, assumes that, in principle, the possibility exists that objective knowledge 
about this real world can be acquired. On the other hand, interpretivism emphasizes epistemologically that 
knowledge is always determined by the subject and, thus, there is no such thing as objective knowledge (see 
Figure 1 and, for instance, Weber 2004). 
2 Epistemology is concerned with the question of how humans can achieve “true knowledge”. It specifically 
addresses the relationship between the object of knowledge and the knowledge acquired. Here, it elaborates the 
influence of the subject on the process of achieving knowledge: is knowledge potentially objective or subjective?
3 Ontology is concerned with the question of whether or not a ‘real world’ exists: does a reality exist beyond human 
speech and cognition processes? The question of epistemology is dependent on the question of ontology in the sense 
that an ontological statement is the basis for discussing (epistemologically) to which (‘real world’) object human 
knowledge can possibly refer.
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• Standpoint II: positivism and interpretivism share neither the epistemological nor the ontological assumption. 
According to this understanding, positivism is based on the doctrine of ontological realism, which maintains 
that reality is independent of the observer, whereas interpretivism relies on the hermeneutic and 
phenomenological tradition, in which such observer-independence of reality is not usually accepted (Moran 
2000; Varey et al. 2002) (see again Figure 1).
Figure 1. Analyzing Epistemological Assumptions of Interpretivism and Positivism (see 
Niehaves & Stahl 2006)
In the course of this paper, we adopt Standpoint I for a variety reasons. First, our primary research objective is to 
analyze the consequences of different epistemologies for design science research (evaluation). One can logically 
conclude that, once the impact of the finer distinction between positivism and interpretivism (only epistemological 
differences) on the understanding of design science has been proven, proving the impact of the greater difference of 
the two (also ontological ones) would be made easier. Second, paper length restrictions necessitate focusing the 
analysis on the most relevant aspects, epistemology in this case. Consequently, we understand positivism as a 
paradigm that assumes the existence of a ‘real world’ and that one can, in principle, achieve objective knowledge 
about reality. On the other hand, interpretivism is understood as assuming the existence of a ‘real world’, but 
neglecting the possibility of achieving objective knowledge of it. In this context, knowledge (more specifically, the 
relationship between the object of knowledge and the knowledge achieved) is always influenced by the 
subject/individual.4 However, what are the practical consequences of an interpretivist epistemology for IS research 
practice?
Interpretivism emphasizes the influence of the subject on the process of achieving knowledge. Klein & Myers 
(1999) attempt to operationalize an interpretivist stance for conducting and evaluating IS research. While positivism 
aims at “theoretically excluding” the subject influence within the research process, interpretivism tries to make it 
transparent or accessible. However, there are several theoretical alternatives which provide a subjective influence on 
the process of achieving knowledge, e.g. different languages and conceptualizations. Klein & Myers (1999) adopt 
the concept of hermeneutics with its fundamental methodological aspect, the ‘hermeneutic circle’ (Butler 1998; 
Gadamer 1990). From a historical perspective, a basic objective of hermeneutics is to provide a way of 
understanding texts (Boland 1985; Rathswohl 1991). In this respect, the hermeneutic circle describes the process of 
reading texts (“parts”) against the background of previous understanding of “the entire/the whole that they form”. 
This understanding influences the way in which a certain text is perceived. The reading of the text itself, in turn 
shapes the understanding of “the entire”. Thus, according to hermeneutics, the process of gaining knowledge is 
influenced by a circle of (previous) understanding, gaining new knowledge, and then achieving a better 
understanding of “the entire”. Hermeneutics are often treated as a methodology, if both certain texts and ‘real world’
observations are not self-evident, but must rather be interpreted appropriately (Hirschheim & Klein 1989). This is 
4 In this paper, we do not attempt to analyze the question of paradigmatic (in)commensurability between positivism
and interpretivism, but refer to the extensive discussion in the IS literature (see, for instance, Kuhn 1962; Lee 1991; 
Lee 1989; Trauth & Jessup 2000; Weber 2004). 
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also reflected in the evaluation of interpretive research: it is contextualized and embedded in a historical and social 
setting. Special attention must be paid, for instance, to the social and historical background, alongside multiple 
interpretations by the individuals involved, including the researchers’ involvement, the question of generalization, 
and possible bias and distortion in the narratives collected from participants (see Table 2 for details). The question 
arises of whether an interpretivist perspective – which basically addresses the influence of the subject on the process 
of achieving knowledge – is restricted to certain areas of study, for instance field studies or behavioral science 
research, or whether it offers broader potential.
Table 2: Principles for Interpretive Field Studies in IS (Klein & Myers 1999)
Principle Description
(1) Fundamental Principle of the 
Hermeneutic Circle
All human understanding is achieved by iterating between considering the 
interdependent meaning of parts and the whole that they form
(2) Principle of Contextualization Requires critical reflection of the social and historical background of the research 
setting, so that the intended audience can see how the current situation under 
investigation emerged
(3) Principle of Interaction 
Between the Researchers and 
the Subjects 
Requires critical reflection on how the research materials (or ‘data’) were socially 
constructed through the interaction between researchers and participants.
(4) Principle of Abstraction and 
Generalization 
Requires relating the idiographic details revealed by the data interpretation through the 
application of Principles 1 and 2 to theoretical, general concepts that describe the 
nature of human understanding and social action.
(5) Principle of Dialogical 
Reasoning 
Requires sensitivity to possible contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions 
guiding the research design and actual findings 
(6) Principle of Multiple 
Interpretations
Requires sensitivity to possible differences in interpretations among the participants, as 
expressed typically in multiple narratives or stories of the same sequence of events 
under study
(7) Principle of Suspicion Requires sensitivity to possible "bias" and “systematic distortions" in the narratives 
collected from the participants 
Design Science Research and its Evaluation
At present, several research endeavors have already been made in order to conceptualize and apply design science: 
general design science (Simon 1981), design science in IS research (Au 2001; Boland & Day 1989; Hevner et al. 
2004; Lee 2000; March & Smith 1995; Nunamaker et al. 1991; Rossi & Sein 2003; Walls et al. 1992). While a 
research process can comprise diverse stages (Mingers 2001; Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998), understanding and acting 
being major categories, design science focuses on the latter being a “problem solving paradigm” (Hevner et al. 
2004). The complementary “problem understanding paradigm” (Hevner et al. 2004) is often referred to as natural 
science or behavioral science research (Hevner et al. 2004; March & Smith 1995; Simon 1981) (for details see 
Table 3).
Behavioral science research and design science research are two complementary parts of the IS research cycle 
(Hevner et al. 2004; March & Smith 1995). Acquiring knowledge about information systems employed in an 
organizational context requires the application of both research paradigms. Starting from pre-scientific observation 
of IS and information technology (IT) usage in practice, theories about IS-related issues are developed. These 
theories are intended primarily to explain and predict human behavior, information system function, and issues 
interrelated with both of these aspects. Through the process of justification, these theories are then considered to be 
either true or valid. Thus, they provide a basic understanding of the (real world) problem situation described in the 
first instance. This understanding constitutes the basis for designing IT artifacts that address a given problem 
situation. These IT artifacts are intended to be useful for problem solving and to change the IS usage in practice. For 
this reason, they provide new impulses for theory development. Hence, behavioral and design science can be 
considered as two complementary perspectives on IS research (Hevner et al. 2004; March & Smith 1995), rather 
than as the two “paradigms” according to Kuhn’s (1962) understanding. This interconnection between and the 
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duality of behavioral and design science provides an means of differentiating the IS discipline from either purely 
behavioral or purely design-oriented disciplines (Lee 2000). 
Table 3: Behavioral vs. Design Science Research (see Hevner et al. 2004; March & Smith 1995)
Criterion Behavioral Science Research (BSR) Design Science Research (DSR)
Object of Study BSR studies both natural and artificial 
phenomena (March & Smith 1995) 
BSR studies “organizational human phenomena 
surrounding the analysis, design, 
implementation, management, and use of 
information systems” (Hevner et al. 2004)
Human-Computer-Interaction (Hevner et al. 
2004)
DSR studies artificial phenomena (March & Smith 
1995) 
IT artefact design (Hevner et al. 2004)
Results/Outputs BSR develops and justifies theories which 
explain or predict organisational human 
phenomena surrounding the analysis, design, 
implementation, management, and use of 
information systems (Hevner et al. 2004) 
Theories are “deep, principled explanations of 
phenomena” (March & Smith 1995)
“Rather than producing general theoretical 
knowledge, design scientists produce and apply
knowledge of tasks or situations in order to create 
effective artefacts.” (March & Smith 1995)
DSR creates innovations that define ideas, 
practices, technical capabilities, and product 
through the analysis, design, implementation, 
management, and use of information systems 
(Hevner et al. 2004)
Objective “The behavioural science paradigm seeks to find 
out ‘what is true.’” (Hevner et al. 2004)
“Products of natural science research are 
evaluated against norms of truth, or explanatory 
power” (March & Smith 1995)
“The design science paradigm seeks to create ‘what 
is effective.’” (Hevner et al. 2004) 
Relation to 
Knowledge
BSR is “knowledge-producing” (March & Smith 
1995)
DSR is “knowledge-using” (March & Smith 1995)
BSR is “descriptive and explanatory in intent” 
(March & Smith 1995)
DSR “offers prescriptions and creates artefacts that 
embody those prescriptions.” (March & Smith 1995)
Normative 
Dimension
BSR is a “problem understanding paradigm” 
(Hevner et al. 2004)
DSR is a “problem solving paradigm” 
(Hevner et al. 2004)
Moreover, the literature provides us with ‘design science research guidelines’ (Hevner et al. 2004) on how to 
conduct and evaluate design science in IS research (rigor). The guidelines suggested by Hevner et al. (2004) were 
developed specifically for the IS discipline, but they could also be interpreted in a more general way, so that they 
would be applicable to related design disciplines. Some general categories are addressed: solving a relevant 
problem, making a significant contribution, designing an effective artifact, evaluating this artifact, doing this 
rigorously, and communicating the research result in an appropriate manner (see Table 4). By applying these 
guidelines, a design researcher should be able to contribute to the body of design science knowledge (in a rigorous 
manner). Hevner et al. (2004) argue that this contribution to an existing body of knowledge is what separates design 
science research from design practice. Subsequently, the design science research guidelines aim at producing and 
evaluating a certain type of knowledge – design knowledge, for instance, design theories (Markus et al. 2002; Walls 
et al. 1992), models, methods, processes, or implementations – in a standardized way. However, when it comes to 
discussing the production of (‘true’) knowledge, the question arises as to what epistemological assumptions underlie 
this.
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Table 4: Design Science Research Guidelines (Hevner et al. 2004)
Guideline Description
Guideline 1: Design as 
an artifact




The objective of design science research is to develop technology-based solutions to important 
and relevant business problems.
Guideline 3: Design 
evaluation
The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artifact must be demonstrated rigorously by means of 
well-executed evaluation methods.
Guideline 4: Research 
contribution
Effective design science research must provide clear and verifiable contributions in the areas of the 
design artefact, design foundations, and/or design methodologies.
Guideline 5: Research 
rigor
Design science research relies upon the application of rigorous methods in both the construction 
and evaluation of the design artifact.
Guideline 6: Design as 
a search process
The search for an effective artifact requires utilizing available means to reach desired ends while 




Design science research must be presented effectively both to technology-oriented and 
management-oriented audiences. 
Epistemological Perspectives on Design Science Research
The issue of epistemology is not separate from, but inherent to design science research (evaluation)! Epistemology is 
concerned with how to achieve “true knowledge”. While Hevner et al. (2004) and others argue that design science 
research is a third paradigm that adds up to interpretivism and positivism (see, for instance, Vaishnavi & Kuechler 
2006), we  argue that epistemological assumptions also underlie design science research and impact heavily on how 
such design science research can be conducted and evaluated. One major argument for understanding design science 
as a “third paradigm” is that design science is concerned with designing artifacts, while only behavioral science 
would seek to produce “true knowledge” in terms of certain justified theories (Hevner et al. 2004). We now refer to 
the discussion of what separates design science from design practice: it is a contribution to the body of design 
knowledge. Design practice is concerned mainly with applying existing knowledge, while design science research 
seeks to add new knowledge to the existing body of knowledge, for instance, in terms of design theories (Markus et 
al. 2002; Walls et al. 1992). In order to assess the quality of such potential contributions to the body of design 
knowledge and to evaluate the (research) process which led to this knowledge, Hevner et al. (2004) propose a set of 
design science research guidelines. These are intended to aid in achieving and evaluating design knowledge. At this 
point, it should become obvious that the question of epistemology, which is that of achieving “true knowledge”, is 
not separate from design science research, but that both concepts are inevitably intertwined. It is argued that design 
knowledge would not necessarily have to be “true” in order to be “good”. March and Smith (1995) state: “Well-
informed actions (i.e., those based on true beliefs) are more likely to achieve desired ends. Information is valuable 
insofar as it helps individuals form true beliefs which, in turn, promote effective, goal achieving action” (p. 251). 
Therefore, an epistemological viewpoint on assessing design science research would suggest analyzing the question 
of how different (epistemological) assumptions about how humans can achieve knowledge influence the way that 
design scientists research new knowledge and the way that such knowledge can be evaluated. 
Further arguments in favor of the inherence of epistemology for designing science research can be found: 
Epistemology is concerned with how humans can achieve “true knowledge”. One could consider at which points of 
the scientific process humans are involved. We argue firstly with respect to the observation field, and secondly, at 
the researcher level. Firstly, socio-technical system thinking is inherent to IS research. Also, due to this strong social 
perspective, research on these systems necessitates a philosophy and especially epistemology-based foundation 
which recognizes the social aspects of knowledge creation and use (see, for instance, Brown & Duguid 2000). 
Secondly, also at the researcher level, the question of how humans can achieve “true knowledge” becomes relevant, 
even if one only observes technical systems, rather than socio-technical systems. In this context, epistemology 
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would scrutinize the possibility of “objective” research knowledge, irrespective of whether the research subject is 
ultimately purely technical (see also Niehaves and Stahl 2006).  
Table 5: Example of Diverse Epistemologies In Behavioral and Design Science Research









Miranda and Saunders  (2003): The Social Construction of Meaning: An Alternative Perspective 
on Information Sharing
Schultze and Leidner (2002): Studying Knowledge Management in Information Systems 




Hevner et al. (2004): Design Science in Information Systems Research




Boland and Day (1989): The Experience of System Design: A Hermeneutic of Organizational 
Action
Hence, we sought to provide arguments against the seemingly common perception that design science would be a 
“third paradigm” amounting to positivism and interpretivism (among other epistemologies). We also provided 
arguments supporting the notion that the issues of epistemology and design science research (evaluation) are 
inextricably intertwined (see also, for instance, McKay & Marshall 2005; Schön 1983). An empirical observation in 
the IS literature supports this line of reasoning. That is, a focused literature review revealed several IS research 
pieces, both in behavioral and design science research, that entail different epistemologies, positivism and 
interpretivism (see Table 5). The design science research guidelines, as suggested by Hevner et al. (2004), have a 
positivist epistemological assumption (a similar assessment can be found in McKay & Marshall 2005). For reasons 
of a pluralism and diversity of research perspectives, an epistemological reflection of these guidelines is 
compulsory. 
Epistemological Reflection of Design Science Research Guidelines
At present, the debate on design science research (evaluation) follows a rather implicit positivist epistemology. The 
literature provides us with a comprehensive discussion of design science research evaluation in terms of design 
science research guidelines (see again Table 4). Here, we argued that the subject of epistemology cannot be 
separated from this discussion. However, given the current state of research, one can observe a (rather implicit) 
positivist epistemology located within the notion of design science (McKay & Marshall 2005). For instance, in 
Hevner et al. (2004) and March and Smith (1995), significant evidence of such arguments can be observed. For 
example, the researchers promote a positivist approach to the evaluation of design artifacts through mathematical 
formalisms or experimentation (reliance on subject groups using design artifacts within semi-controlled 
environments) (McKay & Marshall 2005). Furthermore, the researchers presume a positivist understanding of the 
relationship between research and practice. The main objective of designing scientific research is to produce 
objective knowledge, which is then applied through design practice (Hevner et al. 2004). Implicit is, here, the 
assumption that, in principle, it is possible to achieve “objective” knowledge (see Schön 1983).5
5 Simon’s (1981) work on design science, or as he called it, the “science of the artificial”, is the foundation of March 
and Smith’s (1995) and Hevner et al.’s (2004) recent work. Schön (1983) elaborated in some detail, the positivist 
assumption of the relationship between design research and design practice in Simon’s work. Given that recent 
research in IS draws heavily on Simon, similar arguments can also be applied here. 
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Table 6: Interpretivist Views on Selected Hevner et al.’s Design Science Research Guidelines
Hevner et al.’s (2004) 
Guidelines Interpretivist Reflection and Core Questions (based on Klein & Myers 1999)
Guideline 2: Problem 
relevance 
“The objective […] is to 
develop […] solutions to 
important and relevant 
business problems”.
• Principle of multiple interpretations: How do the different subjects involved in the problem 
situation interpret it? 
• Principle of suspicion: Are different problem perceptions and definitions guided by bias or 
systematic distortion in the narratives of the participants?
• Principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects: To what extent is the 
(research) problem situation socially constructed through the interaction between 
researchers and participants? 
• Principle of contextualization: To what extent is the problem grounded in the social and 
historical setting of the research case and to what extent are certain insights (not) 
generalizable?
Guideline 3: Design 
evaluation
“The utility, quality, and 
efficacy of a design artifact 
must be demonstrated 
rigorously […]”.
• Principle of hermeneutic circle: As human understanding is considered to depend on 
continuous iteration (hermeneutic circle), what are the criteria needed to ‘complete’ a 
design evaluation?
• Principle of contextualization: To what extent are the evaluation findings associated with the 
social and historical setting of the research and evaluation environment? Are the evaluation 
findings in some way applicable to other situations, and, if so, by means of which criteria?
Guideline 4: Research 
contribution
“[DSR …] must provide a 
clear and verifiable 
contribution […]”.
• Principle of dialogical reasoning: To what extent does the particular piece of design 
research reveal a degree of sensitivity to possible contradictions between the theoretical 
preconceptions guiding the research and the actual findings with subsequent cycles of 
revision? 
• Principle of contextualization: To what extent is the problem grounded in the social and 
historical setting of the research case and to what extent can specific insights be 
considered as a ‘generalizable’ contribution?
Guideline 5: Research rigor
DSR “relies on the 
application of rigorous 
methods […]”
• General: Which methods should be used to conduct and evaluate design science research? 
What are the assumptions underlying these methods? Do certain evaluation methods have 
an inherent positivist background, for instance, the Bunge-Wand-Weber-Ontology (Wand & 






must be presented effectively 
[…]”.
• Principle of multiple interpretations: At the level of the researcher level: To what extent does 
the research communication pay attention to possible different interpretations by different 
researchers (the communication addressees)? 
• Principle of interaction between researchers and subjects: How does the research 
communication explicate a possible social construction of research processes and outputs? 
To what extend is the researchers’ influence critically reflected?
Design science research is not only a positivist domain, but is also open to alternative epistemologies, such as 
interpretivism. Schön (1983), for instance, challenged the positivist assumption in design science. Referring 
particularly to Simon’s work, he criticizes the assumption of well-formed problems that design science seems able to 
address. He argues that relevant problems would be ‘messy problematic situations’ that require ‘an epistemology of 
practice implicit in the artistic, intuitive processes which some practitioners do bring to situations of uncertainty, 
instability, uniqueness, and value conflict’ (see also Cross 2001). Consequently, Schön (1983) offers a constructivist 
approach to design science. The question arises as to why, having a non-positivist assumption, design science is a 
significant field of interest. As McKay and Marshall (2005) elaborate, interpretivist researchers as well, could 
engage in rigorous research in order to better understand the impacts of design artifacts in real world contexts. Also, 
critical researchers might be interested in analyzing how changes in a socio-technical system, due to an introduced 
design artifact, have an impact on the power relation in the given situation (see Markus 1983; McKay & Marshall 
2005). On the case of interpretivist research, Klein and Myers (1999) provide us with a set of principles for 
interpretive field studies in information systems. Although these guidelines do not explicitly address design science 
research issues, they provide an effective formulation of interpretivist principles in research evaluation. Therefore, 
we now draw on these interpretive principles proposed by Klein and Myers (1999) in order to reflect on Hevner et 
al.’s (2004) design science research guidelines. We formulate core questions from an interpretive stance that may 
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arise when discussing selected guidelines from Hevner et al. (see Table 6) and give an example for how such 
perspective might manifest in a design science research project (see Table 7).
Table 7: Fictive Example for an Interpretivist Perspective on Design Science Research
Hevner et al.’s (2004) 
Guidelines Example (addressing selected principles by Klein & Myers (1999))
Guideline 1: Design as 
an artifact
Within the fictive project example, we socio-technically design a management information 
system (artifact type: instantiation).
Guideline 2: Problem 
relevance 
Our first contact to the organization was at the management level. The managers articulated that 
they would experience a lack of information when it comes to strategic decision-making. Thus, 
the lack of strategic information was an important and relevant business problem to the 
organization managers. Other groups involved in the project had a different understanding of 
what would be the main problem. For instance, middle management saw a management 
information system as an opportunity to implement personnel controlling mechanisms (principle 
of multiple interpretations, principle of suspicion). Our analyses [as they would be given in the 
research document] demonstrate different actor’s problem perceptions and their relations to the 
solution developed within the design science project.
Guideline 3: Design 
evaluation
Within this fictive case, we conducted an interview-based evaluation study with interviews one, 
two and three years after the initial implementation. As evaluation findings are associated with 
the social and historical setting of the research and evaluation environment we sought to 
explicate the factors influencing the research evaluation in the specific setting and discussed 
criteria by which we expect this design approach to show the same evaluation results in different 
settings (principle of contextualization). This implies that the question of design evaluation 
generalizability was also taken into account when discussion the criteria for evaluation.
Guideline 4: Research 
contribution
Due to the design and evaluation findings being associated with the social and historical setting, 
the question of ‘generalizability’ is important to the question of research contribution (principle of 
contextualization). A criteria-based discussion of generalizability (see Guideline 3: Design 
evaluation), for instance, including organization size, management culture, top management 
information requirements, change management history, personnel structure, or IT infrastructure, 
would be a step towards mediating between the social-historical embeddedness of a certain 
project contribution and it’s generalizability.
Guideline 5: Research 
rigor
With the fictive design research project, we applied research and evaluation methods that 
comply with the further set of principles for interpretivist field studies (Klein & Myers 1999), for 
instance, methods that were able to appreciate multiple interpretations among the participants. 
Interview-based based research methods – possibly besides design methods such as PHP or 
web technologies – were used within the fictive example. 
Guideline 6: Design as a 
search process
In search for an effective artifact we sought to utilize all available means to reach the desired 
ends. Here, a critical perspective reflects on the process and results of choosing such ‘means’ 
and tries to explicate the multiple participants’ interest (principle of multiple interpretations) as 





Multiple interpretations might not only occur among different participants of a field study, but also 
among different addresses of a research communication process. Accordingly, it was paid 
attention to possible different interpretations by different researchers, for instance, by identifying 
and discussing critical key terms from the project setting and/or used in the research 
communication (principle of multiple interpretations).
We do not attempt to fully solve the question of interpretivist design science research guidelines, but rather give a 
brief outline of how the perception of design science research guidelines varies according to an assumed 
epistemology, in this case, interpretivism. Here, interpretivist design science research can be understood as a 
research perspective that seeks to “produce and apply knowledge of tasks or situations in order to create effective 
artefacts” (March & Smith 1995) (design science research, see Section 3) against the background of a specific 
epistemological position which assumes that a subject has an influence within the process of achieving knowledge 
(interpretivism, see Section 2). Instead of developing a genuine interpretivist philosophy of design science research 
we chose the path to tie together significant streams of the methodological discussion in the IS literature, specifically 
in terms of “Guidelines for Conducting and Evaluating Design Science Research” by Hevner et al. (2004) 
representing the design science research perspective and “A Set of Principles for Conducting and Evaluating 
Interpretive Field Studies in Information Systems” by Klein & Myers (1999) representing the interpretivist stance. 
Both original papers seek to give practical advice for conducting and evaluating research and, as the analysis 
demonstrates, allow for revisiting the question of research evaluation. A practical way of combining the insights of 
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the two original papers in terms of an interpretivist perspective on design science research would be to address the 
question of conducting and evaluation design science research with the help of Hevner et al.’s (2004) 
guidelines/categories, for instance (guideline 2) developing “solutions to important and relevant business problems”, 
but when discussing such categories taking into account Klein & Myers (1999) principles, for instance, allowing
“multiple interpretations” and, with regard to the given example, acknowledging multiple interpretations of what a 
relevant business problem could be.
Conclusions
A comprehensive discussion of design science research offers great potential to our discipline. While there is a vast 
body of knowledge on design-oriented research out there, current contributions (for instance, Hevner et al. 2004) 
could make future design science research more rigorous and researchers more reflective in terms of the research 
process. There is substantial learning potential with regard to both rigor and relevance.
Design science research is not only a positivist domain. We argued that the issue of epistemology (how to achieve 
‘true knowledge’) is generally relevant to design science research practice, which is fundamental to the field. Design 
science research, even of just prescriptive intent, is embedded in a system of theoretical, descriptive, and empirical 
knowledge. Even if we present only a modeling grammar, in research practice, we must consider the extent to which 
we address a ‘relevant problem’, make a contribution, communicate our research etc. Nonetheless, a comprehensive 
integrated view of these concepts does not yet appear to exist, although several calls have been made (for instance, 
Cross 2001; McKay & Marshall 2005). Instead, the debate on design science research and its evaluation is often 
dominated by an implicit assumption of a positivist epistemology. We have provided arguments that using an 
alternative epistemology exerts a substantial impact on understanding design science research and on evaluation 
design science research. We then discussed the impact of an interpretivist assumption, although we did not give any 
preference to a particular epistemological assumption. We consider it essential for future scientific debate to analyze 
relevant implications, epistemological ones in this case, so that research evaluation can be conducted taking into 
account different (epistemological) worldviews. 
Epistemological diversity has substantial consequences for design-oriented research practice. Arguments were 
provided that, given the current state of research, the design science research guidelines suggested by Hevner et al. 
(2004) are based on an implicit positivist assumption. In order to prove the impact of alternative epistemologies on 
design science research evaluation, we analyzed a selection of Hevner et al.’s guidelines in the context of Klein and 
Myers (1999) on interpretive field studies. As shown, the interpretation of certain design science research guidelines 
substantially shifts emphasis when taking an interpretive stance. We could provide only a brief overview on the 
nature of such interpretive reflections of design science research guidelines. Other guidelines, which could not be 
analyzed further within the confines of this paper, would be affected by the particular epistemological stance. 
Moreover, we were only able to discuss a selection of ‘interpretivist principles’ suggested by Klein and Myers 
(1999) and their impact on design science research. Therefore, we would suggest that further research investigate 
more comprehensively the impact of alternative epistemologies on design science research (evaluation). A pluralist 
environment in conducting design science research offers, in our opinion, great potential for solving relevant real 
world problems as well as the ‘internal’ problems that the IS discipline faces. 
Diversity requires conscious reflection. IS research can be regarded as a rich tapestry of paradigms, methods, and 
research approaches (for examples of multi-method discussions including a design perspective see Adams & 
Courtney 2004; Cole et al. 2005). Such diversity is largely a consequence of the multi-disciplinary and multi-
cultural nature of IS research. However, this might result in both problems and opportunities for the field. On the 
one hand, such diversity can lead to a “warring-camp” mentality between different groups of researchers. On the 
other hand, diversity can also lead to superior research, in which diverse research approaches complement and 
reinforce one another (http://business.queensu.ca/icis/tracks/diversityResearch.htm). In favor of latter, that is, a 
constructive pluralism of perspectives, we sought to link two streams of thoughts which well represent the diversity 
in IS research, epistemology and design science research. By doing so, we sought to contribute to strengthening both 
the rigor (epistemology) and relevance (design science) of IS research.
Theme: Diversity in IS Research and Practice
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